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2 0 2 4 PHIL2622 Reality, time, and possibility: Metaphysics Today Why do we disagree about personal Identity? 4 / 2 2 / 2 0 2 5 S A M P L E

F O O T E R

T E X T 2

Theories of PI

• Physical continuity: PI is determined by the chain of physical similarities between persons, and any changes in physical similarity relations between these persons are causally connected. • Problem: The rotting corpse/zygote of a person is continuously physically similar to the living person,

yet not the same as the person. • Psychological continuity: PI is determined by the chain of psychological similarities (beliefs, emotions, memory) between persons, and

any changes in psychological similarity relations between these persons are causally

connected. • Problem: Genuine memory relies on PI definition; too many thinkers problem (human + animal thinker). • Numerical identity (haecceity): PI is determined by numerical identity. •

Problem: Not definable Today

What do people tacitly think that personal identity is?

Are we allowed to challenge what people think PI is? If we ask questions about teletransporter thought experiments, memory transplant, etc, we can test whether

people hold a tacit psychological, physical,

or numerical identity theory of

personal identity. Experimental folk-psychology

Condition 1 Memory removal + attitude/belief/desire

reversal Future non-aestheticised surgery Payment to avoid non-aestheticised surgery Condition 2 No memory reversal

Future non-aestheticised surgery Payment to avoid non-aestheticised surgery Believes that

Physical continuity

is sufficient Believes different PI

theory but risk-averse and think your PI theory may be

wrong Result 1: No difference in payment in C1 and C2 Result 2: Difference in payment in C1 and C2

Do not believe physical continuity to

be sufficient. Believes psychological

continuity to be necessary

Test: Do people take the physical continuity theory to be sufficient for personal identity (PI)? Experimental folk-psychology

Test: Do people take the physical continuity theory to be necessary for personal identity (PI)? Condition 1 Teletransporter Future non-aestheticised surgery Payment to avoid non-aestheticised surgery Condition 2 No teletransporter Future non-aestheticised surgery Payment to avoid non-aestheticised surgery Believes that

Physical

continuity PI

is not necessary Believes physical

continuity to be necessary,

but risk-averse and thinks

PI theory may be wrong Result 1: No difference in payment in C1 and C2 Result 2: Difference in payment in C1 and C2

Believe physical

continuity PI to be

necessary Experimental folk-psychology´

Test: Do people take the psychological continuity theory to be sufficient for personal identity (PI)? Condition 1: You are travelling to your favourite holiday destination (fill in), how do

you prefer to travel there? Teletransporter ($20) (0.1% of failure) or Plane ($5.000) (0.1% of crash)

Believes that

psychological is

sufficient Result 1: Choose teletransporter Result 2: Choose plane Believe psychological

continuity to be

insufficient Experimental folk-psychology

Discussion questions: 1. Does experimental inquiry into people’s tacit

beliefs tell us about what the correct theory of

PI is? 2. Are we allowed to challenge people’s theory of

PI through philosophical theorizing? 3. What if anything distinguishes philosophical

theorizing about PI from theorizing in physics?

What do we disagree about when we disagree about

theories of personal identity? • Physical fact agreement • Psychological fact agreement • No further fact agreement (no haecceities)

Does the fact that we disagree matter if we cannot find any relevant facts we disagree about?

Are there any disagreements? • We disagree about what our preferences in thought experiments are.

Different kinds of disagreements Linguistic disagreement “Disagreement about what it means to ‘survive’” • Does the discovery of the word's true meaning change views? Conceptual disagreement “Disagreement about what the different concepts of PI theories mean” • Does redefining the concepts or translating them into each other’s terms remove disagreement? Grounding Disagreement “Disagreement whether PI is

grounded by something and what grounds it” • Does settling whether PI is grounded in something or not settle the debate? Attitude Disagreement “Disagreement about how we react to people as being the same person” • Can we agree on what it takes for a person to be recognized as the same or is this culturally relative? Conativism about personal identity Conative states: Non-truth apt mental states (desires, intentions, emotions, anticipations). Cognitive states: Truth apt mental states (beliefs, reports). Solution: Maybe what looks like cognitive beliefs about personal identity and survival are actually just conations and are as such not truth-apt or not, they are experiential states that can be expressed in a belief like way.

• We adjust our beliefs to make sense of our conations, so that what we believe and what we feel are coherent. • When we seem to be discussing beliefs, what we are discussing is actually the truth-value of different conations, but

conations are not truth-apt so there will be no way to settle who is right. Conativism: Personal identity is satisfying desires, intentions, emotions, and anticipations about survival Conativism about personal identity Bad consquences of Conativism: 1. Same causes different effects (some survive the teletransporter others do not). 2. Survival is dependent on conations (can you change conations to change survival) Any Questions? Contact me by email: [email protected]

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