Final Exam Details ECON 2112: Game Theory and Business Strategy T1, 2021 Date and Time • Saturday, 1 May, during the hours of 9:00am-12:00pm (Sydney time). • You can begin the exam at any time during these hours. However, once you begin the exam, you will have 2 hours and 15 minutes to complete it, or until 12:00pm, whichever comes first. Put differently, 9.45 am, May 1 is the latest start time that ensures you get entire 2 hours and 15 minutes to complete your exam. Exam Rules • You have 2 hours and 15 minutes to complete the exam from the moment you begin. • The exam will be open-book/open-notes. You can refer to any course material while you are completing the exam. • The exam is an individual effort. Students should not communicate, cooperate, or collaborate with anyone else during the exam. • You may use computational software such as Excel to calculate answers. We expect every student to give a genuine, honest individual effort. There will be close monitoring for evidence of collaboration, and any form of cheating will be treated as academic misconduct. Because it is "open-book", you may also consult materials from outside the course. We do not recommend this. Consulting outside sources will typically only take up valuable time -- the opportunity cost is high! Further, allowed "outside sources" do not include content sharing sites and social media platforms. Soliciting help for exam questions from other students or anyone else is considered cheating. Technical issues • In addition to the 2 hours allowed to complete the exam, an additional 15 minutes is allowed to account for any minor technical issues, delays, and/or time to upload content. • No special consideration will be granted for issues that affect your ability to complete the exam for a period of 15 minutes or less. • Please read the materials under the current banner “Final Exam (…)” in the Moodle site. Any announcement regarding technical support or final exam logistics will be posted here. • Details of what to do if you experience technical issues during the exam will be provided closer to the exam date Exam Format The exam is worth 50% of overall course marks, and will consist of • 4-5 questions – each with multiple parts o 25-30 marks for Games of complete information (weeks 1 – 5) o 20-25 marks for Games of incomplete information (weeks 7 - 9) • Questions are of two types o Multiple-choice o Numerical response • The exact set of questions in the exam will be different from student to student, but the content coverage and level of difficulty will be maintained. A note on numerical response questions: Here, we look for a numerical answer which should be accurate up to 3 decimal places (e.g., 3.213). Please use decimals instead of fractions unless there are explicit instructions to the contrary (e.g., 0.5 instead of ½, 0.33 instead of 1/3). Required decimal places (for rounding) will be specified in the question. Exam Coverage The exam will cover all course content, including the material from lectures, tutorials and problem sets. Here is one way to partition the course content which might help in your study • Static games of complete information o Lecture: Weeks 1 and 2 o Problem Sets 1 and 2 o (Primary) Equilibrium concept: Nash equilibrium o Focus: Identifying players, strategies, payoffs. Finding best response, Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; checking for strictly/weakly dominated strategy, admissibility • Dynamic games of complete information including Repeated Games o Lecture: Weeks 3 – 5 o Problem Sets 3 and 4 o Backwards induction o New equilibrium concept introduced: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) o Repeated Games – Finitely repeated as well as infinitely repeated games o Focus: Identifying players, payoffs and strategies. Finding best response, Nash equilibrium, and SPNE in extensive form games (look out for games where information sets are not singleton, i.e., where two or more nodes are connected with dotted line) • Static games of incomplete information o Lecture: Weeks 7 and 8 o Problem Sets 5 and 6 o New equilibrium concept introduced – Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), o Focus: Identifying players, types, actions, strategies, payoffs. Finding best response, Bayes- Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies; check for both cases – one player’s type is private information (e.g., PS 6); both players’ types are private information (e.g., PS 5) • Dynamic games of incomplete information o Lecture: Week 9 o New equilibrium concept introduced – Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) o Focus: Understanding Beliefs, Consistency, Sequential rationality – in addition to everything specified under Static Games of Incomplete Information. Finding and verifying PBE – see the examples worked out in the video, the ones to be worked out in the tutorials, and examples and end-of-chapter exercises in Gibbons (ones that ask about PBE in pure strategies) myExperience surveys: We value your feedback. We hope that this course has been rewarding learning experience. If it has been, we would greatly appreciate you letting the University know by indicating that in your response to the myExperience survey (available on Moodle until April 29). We also want to know how we can make the experience better for future students, and your feedback (especially the written feedback) is invaluable for this. So, whether you loved the course or have great ideas for improvement, we want to hear from you! Finally, We wanted to say thank you. I hope you have enjoyed learning Game Theory as much as we – Chris, DJ, Fabio and I - have enjoyed teaching it and, more importantly, learned and grown intellectually along the way. We have learned too from your thoughtful questions and well-crafted problem set answers. Best of luck to everyone on the exam!
欢迎咨询51作业君
